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ITEM NO=00558907
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX023 MCN = 92218/36274 TOR = 922182129
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS2428 2182128-CCCC--RUEALGX.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
O 052128Z AUG 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEOACC/CDRPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AORC-POG-SB//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 052055Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1959
INFO RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0455
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2464
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3121
RUEADWW/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5452
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 3006
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2/POLAD//
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4497
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 012525

DEPT FOR ARA/AND, INM AND PM
NSC FOR BEERS; DEA FOR OC AND OF
ONDCP FOR PORTER; USIA FOR AR; DOD FOR ISA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: PREL, MASS, SNAR, PGOV, PINR, BL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PAZ ZAMORA WANTS IMPROVED BILATERAL
- COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY:
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2. ON AUGUST 3, THE AMBASSADOR AND EMBOFFS DISCUSSED THE OVERALL STATE OF USG-GOB RELATIONS WITH GOB PRESIDENT PAZ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IS/FPC/CDR Date. 5/26/95
[X] RELEASE [X] DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions
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TS authority to:
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ZAMORA AND HIS MINISTERS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERIOR. PAZ ZAMORA KEPT THE TWO-HOUR, CORDIAL CONVERSATION ON GENERAL THEMES. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED OUR CONCERNS WITH THE ANTI-U.S. TONE OF RECENT POLITICAL DEBATE AND THE APPARENT LACK OF GOB CONTROL OVER ITS OWN CONGRESS AND URGED THE GOB, AS A MATURING DEMOCRACY, TO BETTER DEFEND ITS OWN POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS. HE ALSO ASKED PAZ ZAMORA ABOUT COCA DIPLOMACY, WHICH THE PRESIDENT OFFERED TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL LATER.

3. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION WITH THE EMBASSY AND WITHIN THE GOB, BUT THE FORMER IS MORE LIKELY THAN THE LATTER. SENIOR EMBASSY AND GOB OFFICIALS MAY BEGIN A SERIES OF COORDINATION MEETINGS THE WEEK OF AUGUST 10. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT THE GOB IDENTIFY A SINGLE, SENIOR LEVEL SPOKESMAN TO BETTER HANDLE THE PRESS AND OFFERED AN IV GRANT TO SUPPORT THIS GOB POSITION. ON POSTPONED CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS, PAZ ZAMORA RECOGNIZED THEIR VALUE, INDICATED THAT U.S. MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS PROBABLY WOULD BE APPROVED AFTER THE AUGUST 6 RESUMPTION OF CONGRESS, AND BLAMED THE RECENT CONTROVERSY ON THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION. PAZ ZAMORA SEEMS GENUINE IN HIS DESIRE FOR IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT HIS KEY MINISTERS' DIFFERING ABILITIES AND AGENDAS COMPLICATE HOW THOSE DESIRES WILL BE ACHIEVED. OUR SHARED BILATERAL GOALS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY SOUND AND SUPPORTED BY THE GOB. THE CHALLENGE LIES IN HELPING THE GOB ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS WITHOUT "CO-GOVERNING." END SUMMARY.

SETTING

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4. THE EVENING OF AUGUST 3, THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON GOB PRESIDENT JAIME PAZ ZAMORA IN HIS OFFICIAL RESIDENCE TO DISCUSS THE OVERALL STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, THROWN OUT OF KILTER BY A SERIES OF CONTROVERSIES OVER:

-- U.S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PRESENCE IN BOLIVIA AND THE PURPOSE OF SUCH DEPLOYMENTS;

-- THE FY92 COUNTERNARCOTICS AGREEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMY IN COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS;

-- THE MISHANDLED EXTRADITION OF ASUNTA ROCA SUAREZ AND THE STILL PENDING 1990 DRAFT EXTRADITION TREATY;

-- THE STATUS OF DEA PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY; AND

-- THE SHOOTING INCIDENT INVOLVING A DEA EMPLOYEE, LEADING

TO DEMANDS TO TERMINATE DEA DIPLOMATIC STATUS

ALL THESE EVENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AGAINST A STEADY DRONE OF CRITICISM -- UNSUBSTANTIATED -- OF DEA/UMOPAR (RURAL COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE) ABUSES DURING ON-GOING ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS.

5. WITH THE PRESIDENT WERE FOREIGN MINISTER RONALD MACLEAN AND INTERIOR MINISTER CARLOS SAAVEDRA. ACCOMPANYING THE AMBASSADOR WERE THE DCM AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER). THE TWO-HOUR MEETING WAS CORDIAL, LOW-KEY, AND BUSINESS-LIKE. CASUALLY-ATTIRED, PAZ ZAMORA HAD BEEN WORKING ALL DAY ON HIS AUGUST 6 NATIONAL DAY SPEECH.

GRINGO-BASHING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO GOB AND USG

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6. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
DIRECTION BILATERAL RELATIONS SEEMED TO BE HEADED. IN BOLIVIAN POLITICAL AND MEDIA DEBATE, THERE SEEMED TO BE A PERSISTENT ANTI-U.S. THEME. ISSUES THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY BENEFICIAL TO BOLIVIANS, SUCH AS U.S. MILITARY HUMANITARIAN CIVIC ACTION (HCA) PROGRAMS, WERE BEING USED BY NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS (AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS), THE GOB'S ENEMIES, THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION, AND EVEN MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING PARTIES TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOB SEEMED TO BE LOOKING MORE FOR POLITICAL SCAPEGOATS THAN TANGIBLE SOLUTIONS. MEANWHILE, THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE, SUCH AS THE ORPHANS IN LA PAZ WHOSE HCA PROJECT WAS POSTPONED AT THE LAST MINUTE BY THE GOB, WENT ON WITH THEIR NEEDS UNMET.

7. THE AMBASSADOR REMINDED PAZ ZAMORA THAT BOLIVIA-U.S. RELATIONS WERE AT A KEY POINT. ON ONE HAND, OF ALL THE COUNTRIES FIGHTING THE DRUG WAR, BOLIVIA PROBABLY HAD THE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH THE USG LIKELY TO RE-EXAMINE (IF NOT CUT BACK) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, THE UNCHECKED "ANTI-YANQUISMO" IN BOLIVIA AND THE GOB'S PREOCCUPATION WITH PUZZLING (TO WASHINGTON) ISSUES SUCH AS THE "INDUSTRIALIZATION" OF COCA COULD DAMAGE FUTURE USG-GOB RELATIONS.

8. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT THE PAZ ZAMORA ADMINISTRATION'S SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CAREFULLY-BUILT "NEW" BOLIVIAN IMAGE WERE BEING DAMAGED BY THESE CONTROVERSIES AND THE APPARENT LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE GOB. STRESSING THE SHARED

GOALS OF DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE WAR ON DRUGS THAT UNDERPINNED USG-GOB RELATIONS, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED 1) FOR PAZ ZAMORA'S VIEWS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND 2) THAT GRINGO-BASHING NOT BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE 1993 ELECTION.

NEED FOR BETTER COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION

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9. IN REPLY, PAZ ZAMORA SAID THAT THE ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC WAS A VEHICLE FOR THE IRRESPONSIBLE POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO ATTACK THE GOB. HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR IMPROVED, "MORE TRANSPARENT" BILATERAL COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION. PAZ ZAMORA ALSO COMMISERATED ON (BUT OFFERED NO SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE) THE WOEFUL STATE OF THE BOLIVIAN MEDIA, WHICH LOOKED FOR WAYS TO GENERATE CONTROVERSY (IF NOT DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE GOB AND USG). PAZ ZAMORA, MACLEAN AND SAAVEDRA ALL STRESSED THE "NEVER BETTER" STATE OF USG-GOB RELATIONS AND THE GENERAL USG-GOB AGREEMENT ON "PRINCIPLES."

10. WITH A SIGNIFICANT RESERVOIR OF GOODWILL FOR THE U.S. AMONG THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE, AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USG A PRIORITY FOR THE GOB, THE RECENT CONTROVERSIES AND THE "ANTI-YANQUI" SENTIMENT WERE PARTICULARLY DISTURBING, THEY ARGUED. ACCORDING TO PAZ ZAMORA, NOTHING HAD CHANGED IN THE EXCELLENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, EXCEPT FOR THE DIFFERING USG-GOB VIEWS ON LEGALIZING COCA LEAVES. HE OFFERED TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DETAIL WITH THE AMBASSADOR AT A LATER DATE.

JOINT STRATEGY MEETINGS MAY HELP

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11. RELATIONS WERE SO CLOSE AND "FLUID," SAID MACLEAN, THAT MORE FORMAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS WERE REQUIRED, ESPECIALLY ON POLITICALLY (AND CONGRESSIONALLY) SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS U.S. TROOP PRESENCE FOR HCA OR TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS. HE APPLAUDED OUR JULY 31 NOTE REQUESTING GOB CONCURRENCE FOR HCA DEPLOYMENTS IN LA PAZ (THE ORPHANAGE) AND THE CHAPARE (HCA IN EXCHANGE FOR COCA ERADICATION) AND SUGGESTED A MEETING THE WEEK OF AUGUST 10 INCLUDING THE AMBASSADOR, SAAVEDRA, THE MINDEF AND HIMSELF TO:

-- REVIEW ALL THE HCA AND TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS PLANNED FOR THE NEXT 6-12 MONTHS;

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
-- DEVELOP A COORDINATION PROCESS WITH AND WITHIN THE GOB;

AND

-- "BRAINSTORM" HOW TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED A REPEAT OF LAST DECEMBER'S BILATERAL STRATEGY MEETING, IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER.

12. THE PRESIDENT ENDORSED THE SUGGESTION, RECOMMENDING THAT A "MEDIA OFFENSIVE" STRATEGY ALSO BE DEVELOPED. PAZ ZAMORA ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE EMBASSY WORK ON KEY CHURCH LEADERS, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE IN SUPPORTING OUR JOINT COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS.

13. COMMENT: IN A PREVIOUSLY-SCHEDULED APPOINTMENT, THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH KEY CHURCH LEADERS ON AUGUST 4. ON THE JOINT EMBASSY-GOB MEETING ISSUE, THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED A MEETING WITH CONALID, THE CABINET-LEVEL GOB BODY CHARGED WITH OVERSEEING ALL COUNTERNARCOTICS ISSUES, OR ITS SMALLER EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. TO KEEP MACLEAN'S MEETING PROPOSAL FROM FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS (AND TO DRIVE THE AGENDA AND PROCESS OF THESE MEETINGS; THE PRE-ELECTORAL GOB IS NOT LIKELY TO ACT VIGOROUSLY), WE ARE FOLLOWING UP WITH A NOTE REQUESTING A SERIES OF MEETINGS AND PROPOSING A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA COVERING THE ENTIRE RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES (SEPTEL). END COMMENT.

U.S. TROOP PRESENCE "MESS" USED BY THE OPPOSITION

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14. PAZ ZAMORA ADMITTED THAT THE U.S. TROOP PRESENCE ISSUE WAS A "MESS" WHICH HAD BEEN FUELED BY THE POOR INFORMATION FLOW TO AND WITHIN THE GOB AND USED BY THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION. THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT U.S. MILITARY HCA DEPLOYMENTS HAD BEEN POSTPONED SIMPLY TO UNDERCUT THE GOB'S OPPONENTS; ONCE THE POLITICAL HEAT WAS TURNED DOWN AND A NEW CONGRESSIONAL SESSION UNDERWAY AFTER AUGUST 6, THE ISSUE WOULD BE REEXAMINED (AND DEPLOYMENTS PRESUMABLY PERMITTED).

15. SUCH JOINT PROJECTS WERE CLEARLY BENEFICIAL; PAZ ZAMORA'S NEPHEW, A DOCTOR, HAD OFTEN TOLD THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE "ENTHUSIASTIC" U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN REFURBISHING LA PAZ'S RAMSHACKLE MIRAFLORES GENERAL HOSPITAL. AN ADDED COMPLICATION, ACCORDING TO PAZ ZAMORA, WAS THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY; THE ARMED FORCES BELIEVED THAT THEY, NOT U.S. TROOPS, SHOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT HCA PROJECT.

16. MACLEAN AND SAAVEDRA MAINTAINED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE RECENT SANTA ANA HCA DEPLOYMENT CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE TO THEM. THEY BLAMED THE PROBLEM ON POOR COORDINATION BY THE MINDEF. PAZ ZAMORA HIMSELF SEEMED ASTONISHED TO LEARN THAT THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN COORDINATING REGULARLY FOR SOME TIME WITH A WORKING-LEVEL MEMBER OF THE MINDEF'S STAFF SPECIFICALLY CHARGED WITH HANDLING CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS.

17. LATER (IN CHARACTER), SAAVEDRA BLAMED EMBASSY TURNOVER, RATHER THAN GOB INTERNAL INCOMPETENCE, FOR THE BRUNT OF THE COORDINATION PROBLEM. CONTRASTING WITH MACLEAN'S MORE GLOBAL APPROACH, SAAVEDRA RE-RAISED HIS LONGSTANDING REQUEST FOR FREQUENT WORKING-LEVEL MEETINGS WITH DEA PERSONNEL OUTSIDE HIS MINISTERIAL MEETINGS WITH THE AMBASSADOR. CONTRASTING WITH PAZ ZAMORA'S POSITION, SAAVEDRA ALSO ARGUED FOR A BROADER "REDEFINITION" OF USG-GOB RELATIONS.

HCA BENEFICIAL, BUT NO ONE WILL CHALLENGE CONGRESS

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18. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS MINISTERS AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION DID NOT CLEARLY

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION ABOUT ALL FOREIGN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS (AS THE BOLIVIAN SENATE CLAIMED), AND HAD BEEN INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED IN THE PAST (CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WAS SOUGHT FOR THE POTOSI AIRFIELD PROJECT IN 1990-1991 BUT NOT FOR "BLAST FURNACE" IN 1986), BUT NO ONE SEEMED WILLING TO TAKE THE CONGRESS ON. MACLEAN SUGGESTED THAT AN "INTERPRETIVE LAW," CLARIFYING THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PORTIONS ONCE AND FOR ALL, MIGHT BE HELPFUL.

19. THE PRESIDENT AND THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR THAT ANY FORMAL NOTIFICATION PROCESS HAD TO BE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ALLOW A RAPID RESPONSE IN EMERGENCIES (E.G., TO PERMIT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR HELP AFTER NATURAL DISASTERS). AFTER THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT PART OF THE SANTA ANA CONTROVERSY WAS CAUSED BY THE LAST MINUTE USG SCRAMBLE TO SALVAGE THE LARGER COBIJA AIRFIELD PROJECT, PAZ ZAMORA TACITLY AGREED THAT HCA DEPLOYMENTS PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUCH A POLITICAL PROBLEM, HAD COBIJA BEEN ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

WHO IS DEFENDING GOB INSTITUTIONS/POLICIES?

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20. THE AMBASSADOR THEN ASKED WHO WAS DEFENDING THE GOB'S INSTITUTIONS. ON A RECENT CHAPARE VISIT, THE AMBASSADOR, NOT THE GOB OFFICIALS WITH HIM, RESPONDED TO THE UNFOUNDED CRITICISMS, OF A CAMPESINO LEADER. IN THE MEDIA, ALLEGED DEA/UMOPAR (RURAL NARCOTICS POLICE) "ABUSES" ARE ASSUMED TO BE FACT, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE OR GOB REPLY, WHICH SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE MORALE OF UMOPAR PERSONNEL. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT THE GOB SEEMS CONTENT TO PERPETUATE THE MYTH THAT THE USG IS SOMEHOW "RUNNING" BOLIVIA, AND THAT THE WAR ON DRUGS IS A USG-IMPOSED STRUGGLE. DEFLECTING CRITICISM OF GOB POLICIES (MUCH OF IT UNDOUBTEDLY NARCO-MOTIVATED) ONTO THE USG IS NO WAY TO TREAT A FRIEND AND ALLY.

21. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD PREFER TO LOWER ITS PROFILE AND LET THE GOB TAKE THE CREDIT FOR ITS SUCCESSES AND THE BLAME FOR ITS FAILURES; THIS IS ONE ATTRIBUTE OF A MATURING DEMOCRACY. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE DCM URGED PAZ ZAMORA TO USE HIS AUGUST 6 SPEECH TO APPLAUD THE EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES OF BOLIVIAN PERSONNEL IN THE WAR ON DRUGS AND TO (RIGHTFULLY) SINGLE OUT THE ON-GOING OPERATION "GHOST ZONE" AS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS ON THE CONTINENT. EXPLAINING THE IMPORTANCE OF A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN TO THE USG, THE AMBASSADOR ALSO OFFERED TO ARRANGE AN IV TRIP TO THE U.S. FOR A SENIOR LEVEL GOB OFFICIAL WHO WOULD SERVE AS PAZ ZAMORA'S SPOKESMAN.

22. COMMENT: THE IDEA, ALSO FLOATED JULY 29 WITH SAAVEDRA, MACLEAN AND MINDEF SAENZ KLINSKY, HAS NOT YET CAUGHT ON. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP WITH A LETTER TO THE GOB DESCRIBING THE PROPOSAL IN MORE DETAIL. OF NOTE, THE LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR SUCH A SPOKESMAN POSITION/ROLE--INFORMATION MINISTER JAIME CESPEDES--WAS NOT EVEN MENTIONED BY THE BOLIVIANS. THIS OMISSION SPEAKS VOLUMES ABOUT CESPEDES' WEAK REPUTATION. END COMMENT.

COMMENT: COORDINATION, NOT CO-GOVERNMENT

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23. PAZ ZAMORA CLEARLY WANTS STABLE USG-GOB RELATIONS, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO PREVENT BILATERAL RELATIONS FROM BEING ANOTHER FRONT HE MUST FIGHT ON BEFORE THE 1993 ELECTIONS (HE IS FOCUSING ON HIS NEXT SHOT AT OFFICE IN 1997). HE DOES NOT THINK A "REDEFINITION" OF RELATIONS IS REQUIRED (DESPITE MEDIA SPECULATION AND SAAVEDRA'S OPINION), JUST AN IMPROVEMENT IN HOW WE CONDUCT BUSINESS TOGETHER. THE PRESIDENT ALSO WANTS TO DELEGATE THE ISSUE TO HIS MINISTERS (SO THAT HE CAN CONCENTRATE ON MORE

VEXING DOMESTIC ISSUES), BUT THAT MAY BE A PROBLEM.

24. MACLEAN IS AN ARTICULATE ADVOCATE OF CLOSE, MATURE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/
U.S-BOLIVIA RELATIONS AND (LOGICALLY) ARGUES THAT HIS MINISTRY SHOULD COORDINATE ALL BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT HE IS LESS ABLE TO FOLLOW UP WITH ACTIONS; MANY IN AND OUT OF THE GOB THINK MACLEAN'S REACH AS FONMIN MAY EXCEED HIS GRASP. SAAVEDRA, WHO APPARENTLY HAS BEEN PERSUADED TO RETAIN HIS PORTFOLIO AFTER AUGUST 6, FOLLOWS HIS OWN AGENDA AND IS INCREASINGLY PRONE TO SEE CONSPIRACIES BEHIND EVERY PROBLEM. MINDEF SAENZ KLINSKY, WHO IS BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE BLAME FOR THE HCA CONGRESSIONAL FIASCO, MAY LOSE HIS JOB SHORTLY IN A HIGH COMMAND SHUFFLE.

25. THE PAZ ZAMORA GOVERNMENT IS NOT ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS MISHANDLING OF THE RECENT POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES AND OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES THAT BETTER COORDINATION WITH US IS MORE IMPORTANT (AND MORE ACHIEVABLE) THAN BETTER COORDINATION WITHIN THE GOB. WE WILL TRY TO OBLIGE, ENCOURAGING MORE INTER- AND INTRA-MINISTRY COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION AT THE SAME TIME. IN THE PROCESS, WE MAY ENCOUNTER (AND MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT) A MORE FORMAL, FRUSTRATING, BUREAUCRATIC GOB APPROACH. AS PAZ ZAMORA NOTED, OUR SHARED, OVERARCHING GOALS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY SOUND. THE CHALLENGE LIES IN HOW TO HELP THE GOB TO ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS WITHOUT "GOVERNING" BOLIVIA FOR THEM. OUR PATIENCE (AND CREDULITY) MAY BE TESTED IN THE PROCESS, BUT WE SEE NO OTHER WAY TO ENCOURAGE BOLIVIAN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING OVER THE LONG RUN.

BOWERS
ADMIN
BT

#2432

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